The Structure of Morality

THE STRUCTURE OF MORALITY

Here I offer a very schematic picture of moral reasons. Let's start at the top end -- with very abstract ULTIMATE MORAL PRINCIPLES. I give three examples:

The idea behind these principles is something like this: the correct principle (assuming there is only one correct principle) explains and justifies (along with other factors) all other valid lower-level rules and institutions. The Principle of Love, for example, reflects the contention by St. Paul: "For all the law is fulfilled in one word, even in this: thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" (Galatians 5:14). The point here is that all the valid rules and conventions the Christian finds herself observing must express or implement in some way this injunction of love. Likewise, the Principle of Respect can be seen in the Categorical Imperative of the philosopher Immanuel Kant: "Treat everyone, whether in thine own person or in that of others, as ends-in-themselves, never as mere means." Again, the point is that all rules and institutions must express or implement this injunction in some way to have any moral claim on us. But for purposes of illustration I will further elaboarate only the Principle of Utility (made famous by Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill): "Arrange matters so that they maximize human well-being."

Now, if we begin from this very abstract starting point, our thinking (making use of the accumulated experience of mankind) might suggest to us the following MORAL and CONSTITUTIONAL RULES.

That is to say, we may be persuaded that a group of people who act on the rules, "Don't kill, keep your word, do your duty," etc., and live under political arrangements that assure their liberty, provide for the common good, and secure justice will be a group of people as well-off and as happy as they can be.

But consider, for illustration, the Moral Rule, "Do what is just." What does it tell you to do? You can't really know without knowing many other things, things that are stipulated in the institutional order of your society. And that institutional order is defined by the Constitutional Rules and the mechanisms created to put them into effect. Thus, suppose we are persuaded (at a constitutional convention, say) that people thrive best under a scheme of public criminal law in which those accused by the state are allowed to confront the witnesses against them and to submit their defense to a jury of their peers. Then we would create a Constitution guaranteeing people trial by jury in a public, adversarial forum; and we might provide further that each defendant should have a professional advocate (a lawyer).

Further, the legislature created under this Constitution might think utility is served by making sure that the advocate plays a very specific role defined by certain powers and immunities -- e. g., the advocate can't be compelled to disclose confidential communications between himself and his client.

If you happen, then, to be a lawyer in our society, you know that one answer to the question, "What does the Moral Rule, 'Do your duty' mean?" is "Keep my client's confidences if I am representing him in a criminal trial."

Likewise, if you are a citizen, you know that you have a duty, among many others, to serve on a jury when needed. Apart from your specific duties, however -- duties defined by all the other roles and institutions you find your self in -- you have a general duty to keep an eye on the institutional and constitutional order under which you live. Are its procedures and mechanisms really doing justice and really maximizing the well-being of everyone? How could they be changed (and at what cost) to better realize the Principle of Utility? So, in moral reflections, you must necessarily keep one eye on the rules and roles that apply to your case, but at the same time you must not be blind to the higher value that gives the institutional order its purpose.

A similar line of argument can be spun out from one of the other starting Principles. However, note that referring back to the Principles themselves is a tricky thing. Without reference to some institutional order, they are vague in their implications. Thus, criticizing your own institutional order by reference to these Principles often means comparing your own to some other feasible (actually existing) order.